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Strategy-proof club formation with indivisible club facilities

Dutta, Bhaskar; Kar, Anirban; Weymark, John A. - In: Review of economic design 26 (2022) 3, pp. 261-284

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013438537

A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions

Kar, Anirban; Ray, Indrajit; Serrano, Roberto - In: Games and economic behavior 69 (2010) 1, pp. 189-193

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008656798

Allocating multiple estates among agents with single-peaked preferences

Kar, Anirban; Kibris, Özgür - In: Social choice and welfare 31 (2008) 4, pp. 641-666

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003772051

Inequality, poverty and welfare

Dutta, Bhaskar - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001773209

Some remarks on the ranking of infinite utility streams

Dutta, Bhaskar (contributor) - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003547156

Ranking opportunity sets and arrow impossibility theorems : correspondence results

Dutta, Bhaskar - In: Journal of economic theory 71 (1996) 1, pp. 90-101

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001209429

Implementing generalized condorcet social choice functions via backward induction

Dutta, Bhaskar - In: Social choice and welfare 10 (1993) 2, pp. 149-160

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001143106

Strategy-proof social choice correspondences

Barberà, Salvador; Dutta, Bhaskar; Sen, Arunava - In: Journal of economic theory 101 (2001) 2, pp. 374-394

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001644284

Chapter 12 Inequality, poverty and welfare

Dutta, Bhaskar - In: Handbook of social choice and welfare : volume 1, (pp. 597-633). 2002

This chapter is concerned with issues arising from the construction of ethical measures of inequality and poverty. The recent literature on measurement of inequality and poverty emphasizes the close connection between social welfare functions and ethical indices of inequality and poverty. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023831

Nash implementation with partially honest individuals

Dutta, Bhaskar; Sen, Arunava - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003899108