We analyze bankruptcy problems with an indivisible object, where real owners and outside traders want to allocate an indivisible object among them with monetary compensation. The object might be a company that has gone bankrupt or a house left by a parent who has died, and so on. We show that...

This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are not allowed, and studies the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof...

This paper considers a new axiom of a choice function called equal treatment of individuals in an indifference class (ETI) in the context of matching problems. We show that when a choice function satisfies ETI and two commonly-used axioms, substitutability and size monotonicity, any individual...

We analyze bankruptcy problems with an indivisible object, where real owners and outside traders want to allocate an indivisible object among them with monetary compensation. The object might be a company that has gone bankrupt or a house left by a parent who has died, and so on. We show that...

We consider the problem of allocating a single object to the agents with payments. Agents have preferences that are not necessarily quasi-linear. We characterize the class of rules satisfying pairwise strategy-proofness and non-imposition by the priority rule. Our characterization result remains...

We give a direct proof of one-sided strategy-proofness for worker-firm matching under continuously transferable utility. A new “Lone Wolf” theorem (Jagadeesan et al. (2017)) for settings with transferable utility allows us to adapt the method of proving one-sided strategy-proofness that is...

We extend the preference domain of the assignment problem to accommodate ordinal, cardinal and mixed preferences together and thereby allow the mechanism designer to elicit different levels of information about individuals' preferences. Given a fixed preference relation over a finite set of...

Consider a setting in which individual strict preferences need to be aggregated into a social strict preference relation. For two alternatives and an odd number of agents, it follows from May’s Theorem that the majority aggregation rule is the only one satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and...

This paper generalizes the results in Aswal et al. (2003) on dictatorial domains. This is done in two ways. In the first, the notion of connections between pairs of alternatives in Aswal et al. (2003) is weakened to weak connectedness. This notion requires the specification of four preference...

In this paper we consider the exogenous indifference classes model of Barberá and Ehlers (2011) and Sato (2009) and analyze further the relationship between the structure of indifference classes across agents and dictatorship results. The key to our approach is the pairwise partition graph. We...