Bargaining results emerge from the interplay of strategic options and social preferences. For every bargaining game, however, the advantage of a player having certain preferences in terms of negotiated equilibrium revenues might differ. We explore the hypothesis that preferences change according...

In this paper, we develop a revealed preference methodology that allows us to explore whether time inconsistencies in household choice are the product of individual preference nonstationarities or the result of individual heterogeneity and renegotiation within the collective unit. An empirical...

We test 494 households participating in the German Socio Economic Panel SOEP to examine risk taking by one household member that affects a second household member. Choices cannot be explained by (short term) strategic behavior. Respect for the risk preference of the counterpart is at best...

This paper develops a revealed preference methodology for exploring whether time inconsistencies in household choice are the product of nonstationarities at the individual level or the result of individual heterogeneity and renegotiation within the collective unit. An empirical application to...

In this paper, I study dynamic and sequential fair division problems for players with dichotomous preferences. I have devised a systematic approach of designing efficient, envy-free, and strategy-proof mechanisms for generic problems. The mechanisms developed in this paper can accommodate common...

Social Choice traditionally employs the preferences of voters or agents as primitives. However, in most situations of constitutional decision-making the beliefs of the members of the electorate determine their secondary preferences or choices. Key choices in US political history, such as the...

A competitive market mechanism is a prominent example of a nonbinary social choice rule, typically defined for a special class of economic environments in which each social state is an economic allocation of private goods, and individuals’ preferences concern only their own personal...

This article provides an exact non-cooperative foundation of the sequential Raiffa solution for two person bargaining games. Based on an approximate foundation due to Myerson (1997) for any two-person bargaining game (S,d) an extensive form game G^S^d is defined that has an infinity of weakly...

We study experimentally whether heterogeneity of behavior in the Centipede game can be interpreted as the result of a learning process of individuals with different preference types (more and less pro-social) and coarse information regarding the opponent's past behavior. We manipulate the...

This paper presents a model of real effort provision in conjunction with social preference theory to predict how individuals exert effort to replace an exogenously determined "state of the world" with a preferred social outcome. Binary dictator games and real effort tasks are used to examine...