This paper establishes a clear connection between equilibrium theory, game theory and social choice theory by showing that. for a well defined social choice problem, a condition which is necessary and sufficient to solve this problem - limited arbitrage - is the same as the condition which is...

We characterize games which induce truthful revelation of the players' preferences, either as dominant strategies (straightforward games) or in Nash equilibria. Strategies are statements of individual preferences on Rn. Outcomes are social preferences. Preferences over outcomes are defined by a...

This paper establishes a clear connection between equilibrium theory, game theory and social choice theory by showing that, for a well defined social choice problem, a condition which is necessary and sufficient to solve this problem - limited arbitrage - is the same as the condition which is...

We characterize games which induce truthful revelation of the players' preferences, either as dominant strategies (straightforward games) or in Nash equilibria. Strategies are statements of individual preferences on R^N. Outcomes are social preferences. Preferences over outcomes are defined by a...

This paper establishes a clear connection between equilibrium theory, game theory and social choice theory by showing that, for a well defined social choice problem, a condition which is necessary and sufficient to solve this problem--limited arbitrage--is the same as the condition which is...