We introduce experimental persuasion between Sender and Receiver. Sender chooses an experiment to perform from a feasible set of experiments. Receiver observes the realization of this experiment and chooses an action. We characterize optimal persuasion in this baseline regime and in an...

In this exploratory study, we challenge real decision makers to make choices in strategic games involving ambiguity, and to rationalize those choices. Such games are unique because they are not optimizable; however, the challenge such decisions represent-making choices over irreversible resource...

Chapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: No Honor Among Thieves: The Prisoner’s Dilemma -- Chapter 3: The Players -- Chapter 4: Fool Me Once: The Information Set -- Chapter 5 -- Do Unto Others Cooperation in Games -- Chapter 6: A Stitch in Time Sequential Games -- Chapter 7: I Solemnly Swear...