Similar Search Results

Wise choices : decisions, games, and negotiations

Zeckhauser, Richard (contributor) - 1996

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004307558

Fragile commitments and the regulatory process

Blackmon, Bobby G. - In: Yale journal on regulation 9 (1992) 1, pp. 73-105

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001123261

Paying to improve your chances : gambling or insurance?

McGuire, Martin C. - In: Journal of risk and uncertainty : JRU 4 (1991) 4, pp. 329-338

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001116922

Collective silence and individual voice : the logic of information games

Parson, Edward; Zeckhauser, Richard; Coglianese, Cary - In: Collective choice : essays in honor of Mancur Olson ; …, (pp. 49-70). 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001763151

The fair and efficient division of the Winsor family silver

Pratt, John W. - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 36 (1990) 11, pp. 1293-1301

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001100451

Social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining

Bohnet, Iris (contributor); Zeckhauser, Richard (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001872485

Trust, risk and betrayal

Bohnet, Iris; Zeckhauser, Richard - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 55 (2004) 4, pp. 467-484

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002399303

Social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining

Bohnet, Iris; Zeckhauser, Richard - In: The Scandinavian journal of economics 106 (2004) 3, pp. 495-510

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002446361

Trust, risk and betrayal

Bohnet, Iris (contributor); Zeckhauser, Richard (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001874027

Variable Temptations and Black Mark Reputations

Aperjis, Christina; Miao, Yali; Zeckhauser, Richard - 2015

In a world of imperfect information, reputations often guide the sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider two-player situations, where one player - the truster - decides whether to trust, and the other player - the temptee - has a temptation to betray when trusted. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014181330