Using a laboratory experiment, we study the evolution of economic networks in the context of fragmented social identity. We create societies in which members can initiate and delete links to others, and then earn payoffs from a public goods game played within their network. We manipulate whether...

A principal (receiver) considers whether to accept a project whose total value depends on two aspects. In each period, an agent (sender) privately learns the value of one aspect with positive probability. We compare two common reporting protocols: frequent updating, which requires the sender to...

We analyze a legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive issue. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological positions. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. We compare the outcome of the...

We introduce a "nestedness" relation for a general class of sender-receiver games and compare equilibrium properties, in particular the amount of information transmitted, across games that are nested. Roughly, game B is nested in game A if the players’s optimal actions are closer in game B. We...