We introduce a general class of simplicity concepts that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive-form games, and use it to provide characterizations of simple mechanisms in social choice environments with and without transfers. We show that obvious strategy-proofness—an...

We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive-form games. Rather than planning for the entire future of a game, agents are presumed to be able to plan only for those histories they view as simple from their current...

We study frictionless matching and coalition formation environments. Agents have preferences over coalitions, and these preferences vary with an underlying, and commonly known, state of nature. Assuming that there is substantial variability of preferences, we show that there exists a core stable...

We study manipulability of stable matching mechanisms and show that manipulability comparisons are equivalent to preference comparisons: for any agent, a mechanism is more manipulable than another if and only if this agent prefers the latter to the former. In particular, this implies that no two...

We construct quantile stable mechanisms, show that they are distinct in sufficiently large markets, and analyze how they can be manipulated by market participants. As a step to showing that quantile stable mechanisms are well defined, we show that median and quantile stable matchings exist when...