This paper suggests that the evolutionarily optimal belief of an agent's intrinsic reproductive ability is systematically different from the posterior belief obtained by the perfect Bayesian updating. In particular, the optimal belief depends on how risk-averse the agent is. Although the perfect...

Those who receive help may be more likely to help a third party. This pay-it-forward behavior, called generalized reciprocity, can be powerful in spreading kindness from person to person. We use laboratory games to explore the psychological motivations that contribute to generalized reciprocity....

This paper analyzes reputational bargaining between two parties who can strategically send an ultimatum to resolve the conflict by law. Each party is either a justified player who is inflexible about demand and resolves the conflict by law whenever possible, or an unjustified player who is...

We conduct one of the first laboratory experiments and noncooperative analyses of the de-centralized matching market with transfers (Koopmans and Beckmann,1957; Shapley andShubik,1972; Becker,1973). Some theoretical predictions align with but some differ from experimental evidence. Stable matching,...

This paper documents relationships between age at marriage and labor-market out- come reflected by personal income as well as relationships between age at marriage and marriage-market outcome reflected by spousal income for Americans born from 1900s to 1970s, and motivated by these documented...