We consider a supply chain with a single supplier and two retailers. The retailers choose their orders strategically and if their orders exceed the supplier's capacity, quantities are allocated proportionally to the orders. We experimentally study the capacity allocation game using subjects...

Game theoretic models require strong informational assumptions that may not hold in operations applications. In such settings, how do uninformed players behave? We take a first step towards addressing this question by conducting a controlled human subject experiment. We focus on a simple...

Backward induction is a widely accepted principle for predicting behavior in sequential games. In the classic example of the "centipede game'', however, players frequently violate this principle. An alternative is a dynamic level-k model, where players choose a rule from a rule hierarchy. The...

In a multi-server, single-queue symmetric capacity choice game, Gopalakrishnan et al. (2016) characterize the existence of a Nash equilibrium under a requirement on the servers’ capacity cost functions, which excludes some highly relevant cases where servers have ample discretion over their...