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In this paper, we consider a symmetric rent-seeking contest, where employees lobby for a governmental contract on … behalf of firms. The only verifiable information is which firm is assigned the contract. We derive the optimal wage contracts … of the employees and analyze, whether commitment by determining the wage contract prior to the competitor is profitable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343953
We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent's rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010437999
We introduce three variations of the Hirshleifer-Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict behavior and repeated interaction on the allocation of effort between production and appropriation. Without repeated interaction, destruction of resources by defeated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009771751
The paper presents experimental evidence on the impact of managers and their incentives on the behavior of group members in intergroup contests. I find that members follow the nonbinding investment recommendations of their group manager in particular if the managers payoff does not depend on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340540
We examine how cross-community cost or benefit spillovers, arising from the consumption of group-specific public goods, affect both inter-group conflicts over the appropriation of such goods and decentralized private provision for their production. Our model integrates production versus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012295566
We examine how cross-community cost or benefit spillovers, arising from the consumption of group-specific public goods, affect both inter-group conflicts over the appropriation of such goods and decentralized private provision for their production. Our model integrates production versus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012614103
Economic and social situations where groups have to compete are ubiquitous. Such group contests create both a coordination problem within and between groups. Introducing leaders may help to mitigate these coordination problems. However, little is known about the effect of leadership in group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015190589
Economic and social situations where groups have to compete are ubiquitous. Such group contests create both a coordination problem within and between groups. Introducing leaders may help to mitigate these coordination problems. However, little is known about the effect of leadership in group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015191764
We present a general model of two players contest with two types of efforts. Contrary to the classical models of contest, where each player chooses a unique effort, and where the outcome depends on the efforts of all the players, contestants are allowed to reduce the effort of the opponent....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312400
I propose a simple contest success function which relaxes two features of the Tullock probability function. I show that this contest success function could be used to obtain interesting results and is more tractable than Tullock's function in certain cases. In particular, researchers who are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014076161