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Contractual incentive provision and commitment in rent-seeking contests

Gürtler, Oliver - 2006

In this paper, we consider a symmetric rent-seeking contest, where employees lobby for a governmental contract on … behalf of firms. The only verifiable information is which firm is assigned the contract. We derive the optimal wage contracts … of the employees and analyze, whether commitment by determining the wage contract prior to the competitor is profitable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343953

Honesty and relational contracts : conference paper

Holger, Herz; Schmutzler, Armin; André, Volk - 2014

We study the economic consequences of opportunities for dishonesty in an environment where efficiency relevant behaviour is not contractible, but rather incentivized by informal agreements in an ongoing relationship. We document the repeated interaction between a principal and an agent who,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010483887

Complete contracts under incomplete information

Curello, Gregorio; Lyu, Qianjun; Zhang, Yimeng - 2024

We study a moral hazard model in which the output is stochastically determined by both the agent's hidden effort and an uncertain state of the world. We investigate how the contractibility of the ex-post realization of the state affects the principal's incentive to provide information. While...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015135462

(Bad) reputation in relational contracting

Deb, Rahul; Mitchell, Matthew F.; Pai, Mallesh M. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 2, pp. 763-800

Motivated by markets for ''expertise,'' we study a bandit model where a principal chooses between a safe and risky arm. A strategic agent controls the risky arm and privately knows whether its type is high or low. Irrespective of type, the agent wants to maximize duration of experimentation with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273779