We scrutinize the scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities by using …-cost firm under incomplete information: a separating auction implies adverse selection and relies substantially on commitment to … allocation and transfer rules. A pooling auction serves as a commitment device against ex-post opportunistic behavior and …

In auctions with externalities, it is well-known that the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of … stability and fairness. Nevertheless, some auction outcome must be chosen. We separate deviations into two types: deviations by …

In auctions with externalities, the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of stability and fairness. We …

We auction scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in ultimatum games. As a control treatment, we … randomly allocate these rights and charge exogenous participation fees. These participation fee sequences match the auction … to a session-specific Nash equilibrium, and auction prices emerge supporting this equilibrium by the principle of forward …