A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. We...

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. We...

In complicated/nonlinear parametric models, it is generally hard to know whether the model parameters are point identified. We provide computationally attractive procedures to construct confidence sets (CSs) for identified sets of full parameters and of subvectors in models defined through a...

We model sequential, possibly multi-unit, sealed-bid auctions as a sequential game with imperfect and incomplete information. We develop an agent that constructs a bidding policy by sampling the valuation space of its opponents, solving the resulting complete information game, and aggregating...