not onlymutual trust, like simple exchange, but also a substantial degree of coordination. We examinewhether players are …

Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties' trust, defined as their belief in other's trustworthiness, appears … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and … contract enforcement are complements. We demonstrate that under weak contract enforcement trust has no effect on gains from …

Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties' trust, defined as their belief in other's trustworthiness, appears … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and … contract enforcement are complements. We demonstrate that under weak contract enforcement trust has no effect on gains from …

Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties’ trust, defined as their belief in other’s trustworthiness, appears … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and … under weak contract enforcement trust has no effect on gains from trade, but when we successively improve contract …

, trust-defined as the belief in the trustworthiness of others-seems important for realizing gains from trade. This paper … explores an unstudied question: whether trust is a substitute for, or a complement to, the availability of contract enforcement … opportunities. One intuition suggests that trust becomes more important when contract enforcement is weak, implying that they are …

Whether incentive contracts perform better than trust in terms of productiveefficiency is usually explored by principal …, we find that (mutual) trust is as good as incentivecontracts in inducing costly actions by employees. Moreover, we …