This paper considers a situation in which participants with heterogeneous ability types are grouped into different competitions for performance ranking. In a contest, there may be performance spillovers, because of which a participant can benefit from others' performance. A planner can allocate...

This paper considers a situation in which students with heterogeneous ability types are grouped into different competitions for performance ranking. A planner can group the students and design prize structure in each competition in order to maximize the weighted total performance subject to a...

This paper generalizes the results of Siegel (2009, 2010) to accommodate performance spillovers. More precisely, we show that, if for any player, spillover from other players' performance is independent of his own performance, and if the spillover enters any player's payoff in an additively...

This paper studies complete-information, all-pay contests with asymmetric players competing for heterogeneous prizes. In these contests, each player chooses a performance level or "score". The first prize is awarded to the player with the highest score, the second -- less valuable -- prize to...

This note studies contests in which multiple participants compete for two distinct prizes. The participants have distinct constant marginal costs, which are commonly known. We show that the contests have a unique Nash equilibrium, and we characterize the equilibrium payoffs and strategies in...