We study a hierarchical Bayesian persuasion game with a sender, a receiver, and several potential intermediaries, generalizing the framework of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). The sender must be persuasive through a hierarchy of intermediaries to reach the final receiver, whose action affects all...

This paper studies effort-maximizing prize designs in team contests with an arbitrary number of pairwise battles. The organizer rewards the teams contingent on battle outcomes subject to budget balance constraints. Our analysis fully accommodates heterogeneities across players and battles. We...

We study the information design for effort maximization in a simultaneous two-player two-type all-pay auction contest environment, where players have private information about their own valuations. Full characterization of the optimal signal crucially rests on the notion of ridge distributions:...

We study the optimal information disclosure policy in a two-player all-pay auction contest with one-sided asymmetric information in both simultaneous move setup and sequential move setup. The designer can pre-commit to a signal device that generates a type-dependent distribution, signaling the...

Two contestants informed of their own type compete in a contest, and the organizer ex-ante designs a public anonymous disclosure policy to maximize contestants’ total effort. While a mildly-correlated posterior leads to an efficient equilibrium with maximized surplus, a...

We study the dominant separating equilibrium that maximizes the sender's payoff in quadratic signaling games. We relax the common and restrictive belief monotonicity assumption. We introduce a game characteristic called discriminant and show that there exists a linear incentive compatible...