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In dynamic promotion contests, where performance measurement is noisy and ordinal, selection can be improved by biasing later stages in favor of early leaders. Even in the worst-case scenario, where noise swamps ability differences in determining relative performance, optimal bias is i) strictly...
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violated. It is shown that more competition makes the equilibrium signaling more informative when the level of competition is … moderate. Moreover, the equilibrium signaling can perfectly reveal the ability under a certain level of competition. On the … other hand, too much competition always makes the equilibrium signaling less informative. -- Signalling ; Competition …
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This paper studies sabotage in tournaments with at least three contestants, where the contestants know each other well. Every contestant has an incentive to direct sabotage specifically against his most dangerous rival. In equilibrium, contestants who choose a higher productive effort are...
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