A simple theory suggests that a common form of federal horizontal equalization grants should cause subnational governments to levy higher tax rates, distorting local tax bases and so increasing federal transfers. To test this, I examine Canadian provincial tax policies in the 1972-2002 period....

This paper shows how a popular system of federal revenue equalization grants can limit tax competition among subnational governments, correct fiscal externalities, and increase government spending. Remarkably, an equalization grant can implement efficient policy choices by regional governments,...

Canada is one of the few countries in the world where an intra-country formula allocation (FA) mechanism plays an important role in the taxation of corporate income by sub national governments, that is provinces. This paper presents and analyses information prepared for its authors by CRA on the...

Assigning taxes to regional governments is a major issue in all federations. Although neither the literature nor international experience provides clear guidelines on precisely what taxes should be assigned to states, we suggest that Australia should nonetheless reconsider the advisability of...

This paper shows how a popular system of federal revenue equalization grants can limit tax competition among subnational governments, correct fiscal externalities, and increase government spending. Remarkably, an equalization grant can implement efficient policy choices by regional governments,...

This paper shows how a popular system of federal revenue equalization grants can limit tax competition among subnational governments, correct fiscal externalities, and increase government spending. Remarkably, an equalization grant can implement efficient policy choices by regional governments,...