Using a tax compliance game, we study whether the observability of the taxpayer's financial accounting information and the statutory auditor's report affects the tax compliance. We find that firms' responses differ significantly between private and public firms. Private firms compensate for the...

We examine whether tax audit regimes become more efficient if (i) there are audited financial statements and (ii) tax auditors have access to the internal statutory audit report revealing information about statutory audit adjustments. Our analysis is based on a standard tax compliance game that...

Tax audit, tax compliance, tax avoidance, tax evasion, family firms, negotiation strategies, time consumption, audit duration. - Betriebsprüfung, Einhaltung der Steuervorschriften, Steuervermeidung, Steuerhinterziehung, Familienunternehmen, Verhandlungsstrategien, Zeitverbrauch, Prüfungsdauer

This study examines how a strategic tax auditor affects a multinational firm’s transfer pricing in a tax compliance game. Our model uses a divisionalized firm, in both a low-tax and a high-tax country, that decides to implement a transfer-pricing regime with either one or two sets of books....

The Internet Appendix includes formal claims and proofs for the alternative sequence section. The original paper `When do firms use one set of books in an international tax compliance game?' is available at the following URL: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3012231