We extend the notion of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies introduced by Maynard Smith and Price (Nature 246:15–18, <CitationRef CitationID="CR6">1973</CitationRef>) for models ruled by a single fitness matrix A, to the framework of stochastic games developed by Lloyd Shapley (Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 39:1095–1100, <CitationRef CitationID="CR13">1953</CitationRef>) where, at...</citationref></citationref>

In this paper we examine an extension of the fictitious play process for bimatrix games to stochastic games. We show that the fictitious play process does not necessarily converge, not even in the 2 × 2 × 2 case with a unique equilibrium in stationary strategies. Here 2 × 2 × 2...

In this paper we examine an extension of the fictitious play process for bimatrix games to stochastic games. We show that the fictitious play process does not necessarily converge, not even in the 2 × 2 × 2 case with a unique equilibrium in stationary strategies. Here 2 × 2 × 2...