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Pollution standards, technology investment and fines for non-compliance

Arguedas, Carmen - In: Journal of regulatory economics 44 (2013) 2, pp. 156-176

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009793075

Empirical analysis of sanctions for environmental offenses

Rousseau, Sandra - In: International review of environmental and resource economics 3 (2009) 3, pp. 161-194

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008657626

Differential treatment of intentional and accidental violators

Blondiau, Thomas; Rousseau, Sandra - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009008071

How real is the threat of imprisonment for environmental crime?

Billiet, Carole M.; Rousseau, Sandra - In: European journal of law and economics 37 (2014) 2, pp. 183-198

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360954

The impact of the judicial objective function on the enforcement of environmental standards

Blondiau, Thomas; Rousseau, Sandra - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003911380

On the existence of the optimal fine for environmental crime

Rousseau, Sandra; Telle, Kjetil - In: International review of law and economics 30 (2010) 4, pp. 329-337

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008808293

Catching or fining speeders

Delhaye, Eef; Proost, Stef; Rousseau, Sandra - In: Journal of transport economics & policy : JTEP 49 (2015) 3, pp. 415-437

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011304699

Comparison of criminal and administrative penalties for environmental offenses

Blondiau, Thomas; Billiet, Carole M.; Rousseau, Sandra - In: European journal of law and economics 39 (2015) 1, pp. 11-35

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011327604

The impact of the judicial objective function on the enforcement of environmental standards

Blondiau, Thomas; Rousseau, Sandra - In: Journal of regulatory economics 37 (2010) 2, pp. 196-214

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003975071

Catching or Fining Speeders : A Political Economy Approach

Delhaye, Eef - 2007

According to Becker (1968) it is best to use very high fines and low inspection probabilities to deter traffic accidents because inspection is costly. This paper uses a political economy model to analyse the choice of the fine and the inspection probability. There are two lobby groups: the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012728787