We investigate the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions (ZVS) in medicine and related subjects. This mechanism consists of three procedures based on final grades from school (“Abiturbestenverfahren”, “Auswahlverfahren der Hochschulen”) and on...

Die Reform der Studienplatzvergabe ist verschoben - trotz offensichtlicher Vorteile des neuen Verfahrens. Hochschulen können ihre Studienplätze früher, effizienter und nach eigenen Wünschen vergeben. Strategisches Bewerber-Verhalten zahlt sich nicht mehr aus. Das schafft Chancengleichheit....

We document a substantial gender gap in China's gender-blind university admissions system: equally qualified female students are less likely to apply and be admitted to elite universities than male students. Leveraging linked administrative and survey data on students' application choices,...

We theoretically and experimentally study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams. Students hold private information regarding their ability level that affects the cost of their efforts. We assume that student preferences are...

Die Reform der Studienplatzvergabe ist verschoben - trotz offensichtlicher Vorteile des neuen Verfahrens. Hochschulen können ihre Studienplätze früher, effizienter und nach eigenen Wünschen vergeben. Strategisches Bewerber-Verhalten zahlt sich nicht mehr aus. Das schafft Chancengleichheit....

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students’ efforts in entrance exams. Students’ ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare the equilibria of “centralized college admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all...

The matching literature commonly rules out that market design itself shapes agent preferences. Underlying this premise is the assumption that agents know their own preferences at the outset and that preferences do not change throughout the matching process. Under this assumption, a centralized...

The matching literature commonly rules out that market design itself shapes agent preferences. Underlying this premise is the assumption that agents know their own preferences at the outset and that preferences do not change throughout the matching process. Under this assumption, a centralized...