characterize the existence of stable assignments in many-to-one matching problems with externalities. The set of stable matchings … bottom q-substitutability that guarantees the existence of at least one stable matching when the set of estimations includes … all possible matches. Finally, we analyze a notion of the core and its relation with the set of stable assignments. …

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise …-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise … parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core …

(weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for …It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pair-wise stability is not logically related with the …-partner matching problem that includes two-sided matching problems as special cases. Under the same preference restriction, we also …

) blocking dynamics in two-sided one-to-one matching markets with continuous side payments (assignment problems, Shapley and … obtained from the previous one by satisfying a blocking pair (i.e., by matching the two blocking agents and assigning new … the model (i.e., for marriage markets, one-to-one matching, or discretized assignment problems), the existence of blocking …

(weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for …It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pair-wise stability is not logically related with the …-partner matching problem that includes two-sided matching problems as special cases. Under the same preference restriction, we also …

uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in …

roommate problems having a non-empty core. Finally, we show that, if the core of a dominance invariant roommate problem is not … empty, it contains a unique matching, the dominance invariant stable matching, in which all agents who mutually top rank …

core and whether efficient matching is assortative determine the rate of matching, efficient matching, and surplus achieved …We conduct one of the first laboratory experiments and noncooperative analyses of the de-centralized matching market … but some differ from experimental evidence. Stable matching, which coincides with efficient matching in this setting, is …