We consider a competitive search model where firms with vacancies choose between posting a wage ex ante and bargaining it with workers ex post. Workers apply for vacancies after observing firms' wage setting decisions, and dffer in some observable but not verifiable qualifications that affect...

We set-up a real business cycle model with search and matching frictions driven by several shocks, which nests full Nash Bargaining and wage rigidity as special cases and includes other transmission mechanisms suggested by the literature for the propagation and amplification of disturbances. The...

We consider a directed search model in which workers differ in productivity. Productivity becomes observable to firms after assessing their workers on the job, but it is not verifiable. Firms with vacancies choose between posting a noncontingent wage and leaving wages subject to bargaining with...

We set-up a real business cycle model with search and matching frictions driven by several shocks, which nests full Nash Bargaining and wage rigidity as special cases and includes other transmission mechanisms suggested by the literature for the propagation and amplification of disturbances. The...