We consider a decentralized supply chain where a supplier sells goods to a retailer facing a general random demand over an infinite horizon. The retailer satisfies the demand to the extent of the inventory on hand. The retailer has private information about his inventory in each period and the...

We study a single-period two-stage service-constrained supply chain with an information update. The buyer has two procurement opportunities with the second one after observing a market signal, which updates the demand forecast. He also commits to a service level after observing the market...

For serial multi-echelon systems subject to production capacity limits at every stage, we consider a class of modified echelon base stock (MEBS) policies. To evaluate information requirements of such systems, we consider two separate inventory management mechanisms operated in a decentralized...

Suppliers often make proactive investments in capacity to strategically position themselves to win a contract with a monopolist buyer. Such investments reduce the suppliers' variable costs of serving the buyer's demand. We show that an auction mechanism does not always benefit the...

We consider a decentralized supply chain in which a downstream manufacturer purchases components from an upstream supplier privileged with private information about supply disruption risk. The supplier's initial reliability, asymmetric to the manufacturer, is either low or high. We examine two...