Bank regulation presumes risks spill over more easily from large banks to the banking system thanvice versa. Yet, we document that risk transmission is stronger in the system-to-bank direction, because different bank activities affect the flow of risk differently in each direction. We term this...

Conventional collateral requirements are highly conservative but are not explicitly designed to deal with systemic risk. This paper explores the adequacy of conventional collateral levels against systemic risk in the Canadian futures market during the 2008 crisis. Our results show that...

This paper explores the extent to which correlated investments in the futures market concentrated systemic risk on large Canadian banks around the 2008 crisis. We find that core banks took positions against the periphery, increasing their systemic risk as a group. On the portfolio level,...

Conventional collateral requirements are highly conservative but are not explicitly designed to deal with systemic risk. This paper explores the adequacy of conventional collateral levels against systemic risk in the Canadian futures market during the 2008 crisis. Our results show that...

Bank regulation is based on the premise that risks spill over more easily from large banks to the banking system than vice versa. On the contrary, we document that risk transmission is stronger in the system-to-bank direction. We term this asymmetric systemic risk, measure it with net exposure...