The paper employs a standard model of dynamic price competition to study how international principles of value-added taxation affect the stability of collusive agreements when producers in an international duopoly agree not to export into each other's home market. If costs of production are...

With internationally mobile labour and the abolition of national border controls, the individual may not only have private information about his skill level (adverse selection), but also about the length of time he resides and works in the home country (moral hazard) and about his foreign...

This paper uses a new economic geography model to analyze tax competition between two countries trying to attract internationally mobile capital. Each government may levy a source tax on capital and a lump sum tax on fixed labor. If industry is concentrated in one of the countries, the analysis...

This paper studies non-cooperative commodity taxation in a trade model with imperfect competition and trade costs. Nationally optimal tax policy simultaneously tries to correct the domestic distortion from imperfect competition and to shift rents to the home country.

In the optimal tax problem, the maximand is quasi-convex in consumer prices. In such a case, there exists no separating hyperplane between the upper contour set of the maximand and the constraint set. Therefore, the second order properties of optimal tax problems are somewhat non-standard...

This paper analyses the marginal cost of public funds under different international tax regimes when the government has a uniform, broas-based value added tax as its only source of revenue and when countries produce both tradeable and non-tradeable goods. Using the concepts of direct and...

Triest (1990) argues that measuring the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) and the marginal excess burden (MEB) requires equivalent variation measures: MCF should be evaluated at consumer prices while MEB requires the use of producer prices. This paper follows up on Triest's argument by showing...

Two jurisdictions compete to capture the rents of a large multinational enterprise (MNE) which invests locally and which is partly owned by local investors. The MNE contributes to local welfare by tax payments and dividends and it has private information about the efficiency of the operations in...

Discussions of efficient environmental policy tend to recommend taxes rather than quotas on grounds of efficiency; a uniform tax will equlize marginal abatement cost between polluters. When polluters' actions are imperfectly observable, the distinction between taxes and quotas becomes less...

In this paper, we suggerst that one plausible view is to keep us responsible for the parts of the consequences that are independent of the factors beyond our control. Within the framework of a first best taxation problem, we present and characterise a redistributive mechanism that both satisfies...