This paper studies the optimal direct/indirect tax mix in a setting where individuals differ in several unobservable characteristics (productivity and endowments). Tax instruments (income and commodity taxes) are constrained solely by the information structure.

This paper presents a simple two-country model with mobile capital and immobile labour, in which there are two classes of individuals, the workers and the capital owners. A source-based tax on capital income is used to finance transfers to workers. If the two countries are homogeneous in all...

The literature on the use of Differencial commodity taxes/subsidies and that on quantity controls to supplement income taxation have developed separately from each other. The purpose of this paper is to combine these 2 strands in the standard framework of optimal non-linear income taxation.

Tax and expenditure policies are studied in a federation with mperfectly mobile households. States implement a linear progressive tax and supply a public good. A vertical fiscal externality, reflecting the effect of the state policies on federal revenues, provides an incentive to state taxes to...

This paper dels with optimal taxation in a two-class economy with two private commodities and labour. We derive optimal non-linear income and linear commodity taxes in the presence of merit goods. We formulate merit goods arguments via pathology of individual choice. We assume weak separability...

This contribution investigates the effectiveness and welfare implications of fiscal policies in a context of multilateral trade, when traders behave strategically. The present approach deals simultaneously with two aspects of fiscal policies: collecting resources for redistributive purposes and...

This paper considers a government that seeks both to redistribute income and to encourage or discourage the consumption of a certain good. This good is assumed to be either a merit or demerit good. Individuals differ in their exogenous income and in their preferences for the merit good. The...

This paper presents a political economy approach to payroll tax competition between countries adopting different systems of social insurance.

Redistributive taxation under uncertainty has two functions: not only the redisribution of income across individuals who are ex-ante different but also the sharing of risk between them. The economic integration of factor markets changes the distribution of income within each country, and so the...