We examine how a merger affects wages of unionized labour and, in turn, the profitability of a merger under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. If unions are plant-specific, we find that a merger is more profitable than in a corresponding model with exogenous wages. In contrast to the...

We examine how a merger affects wages of unionized labour and, in turn, the profitability of a merger under both Cournot and Bertrand competition.If unions are plant-specific, we find that a merger is more profitable than in a corresponding model with exogenous wages.

We examine how a merger a .ects wages of unionized labour and, in turn, the profitability of a merger under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. If unions are plant-specific, we find that a merger is more profitable than in a corresponding model with exogenous wages. In contrast to the...

An international oligopoly model with unionised and non-unionised firms is constructed to make predictions about the pattern of international mergers.

In the present paper, a situation in which the unionised monopoly is challenged by a consumer organisation fighting for deregulation is analysed as a standard Tullock rent-seeking contest.