Widespread losses during the recent financial crisis have increased concerns that equity-based compensation for bank CEOs causes excessive risk-taking by banks. Debt-based compensation, so-called inside debt, aligns the interests of CEOs with those of external creditors. We examine whether...

We introduce the idea of Executive Compensation Faultline (ECF) strength as a means to capture the alignment of the whole top management team’s incentives across multiple compensation characteristics. We build on previous literature on demographic faultlines, which suggests that strong...

Women and ethnic minority groups hold few boardroom positions. In this paper, we adopt a novel empirical strategy to test whether this is caused by a lack of suitable candidates for director positions or, alternatively, by discriminatory barriers that prevent these groups from progressing up the...

We analyze the takeover premiums paid for a sample of European bank mergers between 1997 and 2007. We find that acquiring banks value profitable, high-growth and low risk targets. We also find that the strength of bank regulation and supervision as well as deposit insurance regimes in Europe...

We analyze the takeover premiums paid for a sample of European bank mergers between 1997 and 2007. We find that acquiring banks value profitable, high-growth and low risk targets. We also find that the strength of bank regulation and supervision as well as deposit insurance regimes in Europe...

We analyze the takeover premiums paid for a sample of European bank mergers between 1997 and 2007. We find that acquiring banks value profitable, high-growth, and low-risk targets. We also find that the strength of bank regulation and supervision and of deposit insurance regimes in Europe has...