In our paper we show that when countries compete in taxes and infrastructures, coordination through a uniform tax rate or a minimum rate does not necessarily create the welfare effects observed under pure tax competition. The divergence is even worse when the competing jurisdictions differ in...

In this paper, we investigate whether partial tax coordination is beneficial to countries within and outside a tax union, in which countries are supposed to compete in taxes and infrastructure. Our results demonstrate that, a subgroup of countries agreeing on a common tax rate, can harm both...

This paper studies theoretically and empirically competition in commodity taxation and product market regulation between trading partner countries. We present a two-country general equilibrium model in which destination-based commodity taxes finance public goods, and product market regulation...

This paper studies competition in commodity taxation and product market regulation between trading partners. To explain the strategic interaction between governments and regulators, we present a two-country general equilibrium model in which destination-based commodity taxes finance public goods...

This paper studies theoretically and empirically competition in commodity taxation and product market regulation between trading partner countries. We present a two-country general equilibrium model in which destination-based commodity taxes finance public goods, and product market regulation...

The standard international tax model is extended to allow for heterogeneous firms when agglomeration forces are important thus allowing us to study the relocation effects of taxes that vary according to firm size. We show that allowing for heterogeneity permits a given tax scheme to have an...