This document is the web appendix for Optimal Tax Policy and the Symmetries of Ignorance (June 2011). University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law & Economic Research Paper No. 11-19; U of Penn Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 11-21. Available at SSRN: "http://ssrn.com/abstract=1856123"...

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