For both two person teams and individuals unrestricted communication between opponents in a finitely repeated prisoner dilemma game results in stage-one cooperation rates of between 95-100%. Content analysis of between opponent communication focuses on the increased earnings cooperation can...

We study legislative bargaining with two person teams versus individuals. Teams pass minimum winning coalitions significantly more often than individuals, meeting or beating the demanding truth wins criteria. Teams have more proposer power, coming significantly closer to the very unequal payoffs...

In finitely repeated prisoner dilemma games, two-person teams start out with significantly less cooperation than individuals, consistent with results reported in the social psychology literature. However, safety concerns quickly give way to teams cooperating significantly more than individuals....

Individuals and two-person teams play a hidden - action trust game with pre - play communication. We replicate previous results for individuals that non-binding promises increase cooperation rates. But this does not extend to teams. Wh ile teams make non-binding promises to cooperate at the same...