Previous research, assuming linear pricing, has argued that telecommunications networks may use a high access charge as an instrument of collusion. I show that this conclusion is difficult to maintain when operators compete in nonlinear pricing: (i) As long as subscription demand is inelastic,...

Previous research has argued that, in the mature phase of competition, telecommunications networks may use access charges as an instrument of collusion. We show that this result depends totally on the assumption of linear pricing. Though under nonlinear pricing, the access charge alters the way...

We show how differences in demand and unbalanced call flows affect considerably the pricing strategies of competing telecommunications networks and this both for competition in linear and nonlinear pricing. Differences in demand give also scope for targeted entry. If networks are close...

We show how differences in demand and unbalanced call flows affect considerably thepricing strategies of competing telecommunications networks and this both forcompetition in linear and nonlinear pricing. Differences in demand give also scope fortargeted entry. If networks are close substitutes,...

Previous research has argued that, in the mature phase of competition,telecommunications networks may use access charges as an instrument of collusion. Weshow that this result depends totally on the assumption of linear pricing. Though undernonlinear pricing, the access charge alters the way...