The Federal Communications Commission is coming under intense political pressure to reclassify broadband Internet access as a common carrier telecommunications service under Title II of the Communications Act. Yet, almost no attention has been directed at the fine details of how reclassification...

Fifty years ago, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter warned the Federal Communications Commission not to view competition in an abstract, sterile way. To illustrate the dangers of using such an abstract approach to the key issue of ILEC market power, this paper uses the Commission's...

This Paper explores asks a very fundamental question: If meaningful, facilities-based competition and "de-regulation" for telecommunications and information services (and, a fortiori, competition and de-regulation for electricity as well) really is the end-goal of this whole "restructuring"...

This paper examines the FCC's ill-conceived notion that new entrants into international satellite markets should be forced to pay spectrum relocation fees just as new entrants had to pay in the U.S. domestic PCS context. This paper concludes that such a "cookie-cutter" approach to spectrum...

In its December 1998 issue, the Federal Communications Law Journal published a law review article surveying the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC or Commission) international policy initiatives between 1985 and 1998. As that article explained, one of the centerpieces of the FCC's...

With the creation and implementation of the February 1997 World Trade Organization Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services (the February Accord or WTO Agreement), the international telecommunications community has (at least on paper) promised ostensibly to move away from markets...

The purpose of this Policy Bulletin is to determine whether wireline and wireless telephone services are close enough substitutes to be effective intermodal competitors. Using the standard tools of antitrust economics, this Policy Bulletin presents evidence indicating that wireless is not an...

This Policy Bulletin makes use of regression analysis to demonstrate that differences in UNE-P prices both across States and within States are due to genuine cost differences and differences in TELRIC, and are not because of regulatory failure by the States. These findings confirm an obvious...

After a brief discussion on expected and actual investment behavior in the telecommunications industry after the 1996 Act, an econometric model is used to quantify the relationship between UNE-P competition and Bell Operating Company investments in telecommunications plant. Using...

Government data on employment in the telecommunications industry reveals a substantial increase in sector employment following passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. This increase in employment reversed the declining jobs trend prior to the Act. Econometric analysis indicates that...