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Holmström's (1982/99) career concerns model has become an important workhorse for the analysis of agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way which may or may not reasonably approximate real-life decision makers'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002501830
Holmstrom's (1982/99) career concerns model has become a workhorse for analyzing agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way, which is difficult to directly test with field data: typically little is known about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012719859
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009544521
To innovate, employees need to develop novel ideas and coordinate with each other to turn these ideas into better products and services. Work outcomes provide signals about employees' abilities to the labor market, and therefore career concerns arise. These can both be 'good' (enhancing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003816581
To innovate, employees need to develop novel ideas and coordinate with each other to turn these ideas into better products and services. Work outcomes provide signals about employees' abilities to the labor market, and therefore career concerns arise. These can both be 'good' (enhancing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012764647
Holmström’s (1982/99) career concerns model has become an important workhorse for the analysis of agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way – which may or may not reasonably approximate real-life decision...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263116
Holmström?s (1982/99) career concerns model has become an important workhorse for the analysis of agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way – which may or may not reasonably approximate real-life decision makers?...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262147
In many economic situations several principals contract with the same agents sequentially. Asymmetric learning about agents' abilities provides the first principal with an informational advantage and has profound implications for the design of incentive contracts. We show that the principal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002691183
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001868941
Labor turnover creates longer term career concerns incentives that motivate employees in addition to the short term monetary incentives provided by the current employer. We analyze how these incentives interact and derive implications for the design of incentive contracts and organizational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014224423