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The determinants of incentive regulation are a key issue in industrial policy. I study an asymmetric information model of incentive rules selection by a political principal endowed with an information-gathering technology whose efficiency increases with the effort exerted by two accountable...
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This paper analyzes the effects of supervisors' (i.e., regulators and judges) selection rules on regulated prices. A checks and balances' regulatory review process strengthens the role of the judicial power and election increases the populism of implicitly motivated supervisors. Election arises...
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This paper analyzes the constitutional determinants of cost reimbursement rules. In order to design the optimal incentive schemes, a possibly partisan planner will take into account the market cost structure, the institutional design of the supervision hierarchical structure and its technology....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312604
The determinants of incentive regulation are a key issue in industrial policy. I study an asymmetric information model of incentive rules selection by a political principal endowed with an information-gathering technology whose efficiency increases with the effort exerted by two accountable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270939