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A characterization of the Vickery rule in slot allocation problems

Zhou, Yu; Chun, Youngsub; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2021

the rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality. Since the quasi-linear single … the only rule satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012488906

Efficient and strategy‐proof mechanism under general constraints

Imamura, Kenzo; Kawase, Yasushi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 20 (2025) 2, pp. 481-509

This study investigates efficient and strategy‐proof mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods under constraints. First, we examine a setting without endowments. In this setting, we introduce a class of constraints-ordered accessibility-for which the serial dictatorship (SD) mechanism is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015415273

An impossibility theorem in matching problems

Takagi, Shohei; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2006

This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that effcient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable in the one-to-one matching model. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332209

Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money

Fujinaka, Yuji; Wakayama, Takuma - 2007

This paper studies the application of the notion of secure implementation (Cason, Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2006; Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2007) to the problem of allocating indivisible objects with monetary transfers. We propose a new domain-richness condition, termed as minimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332239

Second-best incentive compatible allocation rules for multiple-type indivisible objects

Anno, Hidekazu; Kurino, Morimitsu - 2014

strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency property: no strategy-proof rule Pareto-dominates the rule. Such rules are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010250132

Fairness and efficiency in a random assignment : three impossibility results

Nesterov, Alexander - 2014

transfers are not allowed, and studies the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms …. The main finding is that for strategy-proof mechanisms the following efficiency and fairness criteria are mutually … incompatible: (1) Ex-post efficiency and envy-freeness, (2) ordinal efficiency and weak envy-freeness and (3) ordinal efficiency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010438227

Robust stability in matching markets

Kojima, Fuhito - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 2, pp. 257-267

In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that is produced by the mechanism. We find that even...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694986

Efficient lottery design

Kesten, Onur; Kurino, Morimitsu; Nesterov, Alexander - 2015

There has been a surge of interest in stochastic assignment mechanisms which proved to be theoretically compelling thanks to their prominent welfare properties. Contrary to stochastic mechanisms, however, lottery mechanisms are commonly used for indivisible good allocation in real-life. To help...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010478986

Two New Characterizations of Ordinal Efficiency

Dasgupta, Sulagna - 2020

We study the object allocation problem and present two new characterizations of ordinal efficiency in terms of supports … of random assignments. Our main characterization provides a link between ex-post and ordinal efficiency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012823294

Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods

Momi, Takeshi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 3, pp. 1267-1306

In this paper, we show that in pure exchange economies where the number of goods equals or exceeds the number of agents, any Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism always allocates the total endowment to some single agent even if the receivers vary.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011744271