Showing 1 - 10 of 15
We develop a simple model of labor market participation, human capital degradation, and re-training. We focus on how non-participation, as a distinct state from unemployment and employment, is determined by the welfare system in interaction with labor market conditions and personal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264931
We develop a simple model of labor market participation, human capital degradation, and re-training. We focus on how non-participation, as a distinct state from unemployment and employment, is determined by the welfare system in interaction with labor market conditions and personal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014054444
We develop a simple model of labor market participation, human capital degradation, and re-training. We focus on how non-participation, as a distinct state from unemployment and employment, is determined by the welfare system in interaction with labor market conditions and personal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003575472
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003522957
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003604359
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003965004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002410720
We show in this paper how a tax law can be formulated which (i) does not distort economic incentives of individuals and firms, (ii) is based on low information requirements, and (iii) which does not violate important behavioral facts such as fairness in taxation of the subjects. That for, a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014110641
This paper makes use of perturbation theory to solve analytically a class of robust control problems implied by Anderson, Hansen and Sargent (2000) (AHS (2000)) model of a preference for robustness. For the constant opportunity set model, we provide (i) asymptotic expressions that characterize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014116598
Three channels through which the IMF rescue package may affect international leading can be distinguished: debtor-side moral hazard, creditor-side moral hazard, and debtor and creditor-side moral hazard. We show that if the rescue package fully benefits the debtor, no credit contract between him...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014118888