Embedding the efficient bargaining model into the R. Hall (1988) approach for estimating price-cost margins shows that both imperfections in the product and labor markets generate a wedge between factor elasticities in the production function and their corresponding shares in revenue. This...

The analytical background for this research is provided by the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm (SCP). In this view market structure determines the behavior of the firms (market conduct) and finally determines market performance. This paper explains the role of market structure on...

This article examines the role of the interaction between product market and labor market imperfections in determining total factor productivity growth (TFPG). Embedding Dobbelaere and Mairesse's (2009) generalization of Hall's (1990) approach, allowing for the possibility that wages are...

Vega-Redondo (1997) showed that imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome in Cournot Oligopoly. We generalize his result to aggregative quasi-submodular games. Examples are the Cournot Oligopoly, Bertrand games with differentiated complementary products, Common- Pool Resource games, Rent-Seeking...

In the economic literature on market competition, firms are often modeled as single decision makers and the internal organization of the firm is neglected (unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation suggests, one can not generally expect that the behavior of...

We present a formal model of symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous population of profit optimizers and imitators. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round a la Vega-Redondo (1997). Optimizers play myopic best response to the...

One key problem regarding the external validity of laboratory experiments is their duration: while economic interactions out in the field are often lengthy processes, typical lab experiments only last for an hour or two. To address this problem for the case of both symmetric and asymmetric...

We present a formal model of symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous population of optimizers and imitators. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round a la Vega-Redondo (1997). Optimizers play a myopic best response to the opponents'...

This paper models a generalized form of monopolistic competition such that consumers are differentiated horizontally by taste while firms are differentiated vertically by quality location. Consumers have quadratic transportation costs of disutility from consuming a non-ideal brand, and firms are...

We develop a model of Cournot competition between capacity-constrained firms that sell a single good to multiple regions. We provide a novel characterization for the unique equilibrium allocation of the good across regions and design an algorithm to compute it. We show that a reduction in...