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Elective affinities

Di Cagno, Daniela; Sciubba, Emanuela; Spallone, Marco - In: Theoretical economics letters 1 (2011) 3, pp. 134-136

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009669866

An experimental investigation on optimal bankruptcy laws

Di Cagno, Daniela; Spallone, Marco - In: European journal of law and economics 33 (2012) 1, pp. 205-229

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578500

Investigating the determinants of pretrail settlement rates : contingent versus non-contingent lawyers ́fees

Casagrande, Alberto; Spallone, Marco - In: European journal of law and economics 24 (2007) 1, pp. 1-13

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003559630

Relaxing liquidity constraints for start-ups : a welfare analysis over the Italian revised corporate law

Casagrande, Alberto; Spallone, Marco - In: European journal of law and economics 20 (2005) 3, pp. 339-357

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003176970

The effect of competition on tax compliance : the role of audit rules and shame

Casagrande, Alberto; Di Cagno, Daniela; Pandimiglio, … - In: Journal of behavioral and experimental economics 59 (2015), pp. 96-110

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011567383

Financial intermediation and equity investment with costly monitoring

Di Giorgio, Giorgio - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001425273

Vincoli finanziari, investimenti e politica monetaria

Di Giorgio, Giorgio - In: I mercati monetari e finanziari in Italia fra …, (pp. 301-324). 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001489548

Modelli di disequilibrio in economia aperta

Di Giorgio, Giorgio - In: Rivista di politica economica 81 (1991) 1, pp. 91-153

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001108385

Financial intermediation and capital investment with costly monitoring

Di Giorgio, Giorgio - In: International review of economics & finance : IREF 11 (2002) 1, pp. 27-43

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001719315

Overcoming Too-Big-To-Fail : A Regulatory Framework to Limit Moral Hazard and Free Riding in the Financial Sector

Carmassi, Jacopo - 2010

Following the demise of Lehman Brothers, the debate on regulatory reform has been misled into concluding that large financial institutions must be broken up and their risk-taking activities limited by law, as called for by the ‘Volcker rule'. This report of a joint CEPS-Assonime Task Force...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013143328