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Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10015204587
We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10003379095
We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10003185745
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10003960270
We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014061547
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10013443270
It is well known that the rock-paper-scissors game has no pure saddle point. We show that this holds more generally: A symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure saddle point if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors game. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10003949630
We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class of simple imitation rules that includes tit-for-tat but...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10009743040
We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10009544209
We show that in symmetric two-player exact potential games, the simple decision rule "imitate-if-better" cannot be beaten by any strategy in a repeated game by more than the maximal payoff difference of the one-period game. Our results apply to many interesting games including examples like 2x2...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10009569667