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Uncertainty, Legal Liability and Incentive Contracts

Evans, John; Kim, Kyonghee; Nagarajan, Nandu J. - 2008

To address agents' moral hazard over effort, incentive contracts impose risk on the agents. As performance measures become noisier, the conventional agency analysis predicts that principals will reduce the incentive weights assigned to such measures. However, prior empirical results (Prendergast...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027111

Provider Selection and Renegotiation Incentive of Incomplete Contracts : Empirical Relevance on Public Work Procurement

Guccio, Calogero - 2010

the specification of the type of contract to be awarded. Less attention has been paid to the incompleteness of the … contract; this issue is relevant in the public work sector because it offers room for the contract renegotiation and, therefore … procedures (i.e. negotiation vs. auction) on the contract renegotiation in the public work sector. The results show that, in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013149716

Venture capital contracts : a survey of the recent literature

Schertler, Andrea - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013261118

Venture capital contracts : a survey of the recent literature

Schertler, Andrea - 2000

This paper surveys empirical and theoretical studies of various control mechanisms embedded in venture capital contracts. These mechanisms mitigate incentive problems and opportunistic behavior arising in the uncertain environment of financing young hightechnology enterprises that predominantly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011473815

Agent Discretion, Adverse Selection, and the Risk-Incentive Trade-Off

Adams, Christopher - 2003

A basic tenet of incentive theory states that there is a trade-off between risk and incentives. By implication, greater variation in firm profits leads to a reduction in the use of profit sharing. Surprisingly, there is little empirical evidence for this relationship. This paper reexamines the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014088114

Reelection threshold contracts in politics

Gersbach, Hans; Liessem, Verena - 2001

welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold incentive contract stipulates a performance level which a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011408440

Reelection threshold contracts in politics

Gersbach, Hans; Liessem, Verena - 2001

welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold incentive contract stipulates a performance level which a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013361017

Incentive compability of dual transfer pricing

Carstens, Stefan; Weinem, Michael - 2000

We examine the implementation of efficient decisions about accepting a special order with asymmetric information by means of a dual transfer pricing mechanism based on Ronen and McKinney (1970). The model is designed in a simple fashion, two vertically related divisions within a firm...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494194

Communicating subjective evaluations

Lang, Matthias - 2012 - this version: August 2013

Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? In this paper the principal's evaluation is private information, but she can provide justification by sending a costly cheap-talk message. I show that the principal explains her evaluation to the agent if the evaluation turns out to be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009569527

Incentive compability of dual transfer pricing

Carstens, Stefan; Weinem, Michael - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001636080