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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009307514
MIND is a hybrid model incorporating several energy related sectors in an endogenous growth model of the world economy. This model structure allows a better understanding of the linkages between the energy sectors and the macro-economic environment. We perform a sensitivity analysis and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312307
This paper provides a formal survey of price and quantity instruments for mitigating global warming. We explicitly consider policies' impact on the incentives of resource owners who maximize their profits intertemporally. We focus on the informational and commitment requirements of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270640
We investigate conditions that aggravate market failures in energy innovations, and suggest optimal policy instruments to address them. Using an intertemporal general equilibrium model we show that 'small' market imperfections may trigger a several decades lasting dominance of an incumbent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274861
This paper takes the policy failure in establishing a global carbon price for efficient emissions reduction as a starting point and analyzes to what extent technology policies can be a reasonable second-best approach. From a supply-side perspective, carbon capture and storage (CCS) policies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282056
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This paper evaluates the consequences of renewable energy policies on welfare, resource rents and energy costs in a world where carbon pricing is imperfect and the regulator seeks to limit emissions to a (cumulative) target. We use a global general equilibrium model with an intertemporal fossil...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014180771
Using Putnam’s two‐level game approach, we discuss the influence of domestic players that can veto the ratification of international environmental agreements on the breadth and depth of such treaties. We first show that in a symmetric Barrett‐type payoff model, veto-players can restrict...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014158533