General equilibrium (GE) theory faces several related challenges. Classical theories of out‐of‐equilibrium adjustment are intuitive but implausibly centralized. Further, standard restrictions on individual preferences place little structure on aggregate excess demand functions. Amongst other...

We report evidence of an endowment effect for risk, extending previous results to the popular paired-choice lottery setting. Specifically, we observe a distribution of revealed preferences consistent with risk aversion that diminishes in endowed variance, although the effect is considerably...

Ellsberg (1961) proposes two alternative frames to elicit individuals' preferences for ambiguity. Through an experiment, we find that Ellsberg's three-color one-urn frame induces very different revealed preferences than the two-color two-urn frame. In both frames, we document ambiguity aversion...

In this paper we study the performance of an economic environment that can support specialization if the participants implement and develop some system of exchange. We define a closed economy in which the participants must discover the ability to exchange, implement it, and ascertain what they...

Experiments constitute an indispensable tool to validate the building blocks of the theories which economists use not only to interpret events in the real world but also to inform regulation and economic policy. This is especially true in the context of multiple, interacting markets, which is...

The epsilon-intelligent competitive equilibrium algorithm is a decentralized alternative to Walrus' tatonnement procedure for markets to arrive at competitive equilibrium. We build on the Gode-Spear-Sunder zero-intelligent algorithm in which random generation of bids and offers from agents'...

We study the classic Gale (1963) economy using laboratory markets. Tatonnement theory predicts prices will diverge from an equitable interior equilibrium towards infinity or zero depending only on initial prices. The inequitable equilibria selected by these dynamics give all gains from exchange...