Voluntary green electricity programs are a rich setting to study private provision of public goods. A defining feature of these programs is the type of subscription mechanism used for enrolling residential customers in the program. We collected primary data on programs’ subscription mechanisms...

The paper studies the relative effectiveness of extrinsic monetary disincentives and intrinsic non-monetary disincentives to corruption. In doing so, we also test the Beckarian prediction that at the same level of expected payoff, a low probability of detection with high penalty is a stronger...

We study the relative effectiveness of extrinsic monetary disincentives and intrinsic non-monetary disincentives to corruption, using a harassment bribery game. In doing so, we also test the Beckerian prediction that at the same level of expected payoff, a low probability of detection with high...

The paper studies the relative effectiveness of extrinsic monetary disincentives and intrinsic non-monetary disincentives to corruption. In doing so, we also test the Beckarian prediction that at the same level of expected payoff, a low probability of detection with high penalty is a stronger...

The static Nash equilibrium solution for a discretized Bertrand-duopoly market with asymmetric constant marginal costs recommends that the low-cost firm should charge a price equal to the high-cost firm’s marginal cost, and thus steal the entire market. This sharp prediction holds true for any...