I analyze the effects of a merger between two firms in a differentiated-goods duopoly. I make the crucial assumption that the industry is at a free-entry equilibrium both before and after the merger. In particular, I allow for the possibility of entry subsequent to the merger. Not surprisingly,...

I examine the dynamics of oligopolies when fi rms derive subjective value from being the market leader. In equilibrium, prices alternate in tandem between high levels and occasional price wars, which take place when market shares are similar and market leadership is at stake. The stationary...

Critics of Microsoft and Google's dominance claim these companies are nothing but "giants standing on the shoulders of babies," whose dominance destroys the incentives for entrants to innovate. By contrast, pro-Microsoft and pro-Google analysts stress the benefits of large, innovative firms. We...

In a competitive environment, switching costs have two eects. First, they increase the market power of a seller with locked-in customers. Second, they increase competition for new customers. I provide conditions under which switching costs decrease or increase equilibrium prices. Taken together,...

Frequently, new technologies arise under two or more alternative designs. Moreover, the state of each design evolves over time as a result of various cumulative improvements. In this paper, we study the strategic interaction between \incumbentquot; firms (those who already own a design) and...

We provide a simple framework to analyze the effect of firm dominance on incentives for Ramp;D. An increase in firm dominance, which we measure by a premium in consumer valuation, increases the dominant firm's incentives and decreases the rival firm's incentives for Ramp;D. These changes...

I consider a dynamic model of competition between two proprietary networks. Consumers die and are replaced with a constant hazard rate. Firms compete for new consumers to join their network by offering network entry prices (which may be below cost). New consumers have a privately known...

We provide a simple framework to analyze the effect of firm dominance on incentives for Ramp;D. An increase in firm dominance, which we measure by a premium in consumer valuation, increases the dominant firm's incentives and decreases the rival firm's incentives for Ramp;D. These changes...

The received wisdom is that sunk costs create a barrier to entry if entry fails, then the entrant, unable to recover sunk costs, incursgreater losses. In a strategic context where an incumbent may prey on the entrant, sunk entry costs have a countervailing effect: they may effectively commit the...