We investigate the liquidity management of firms following the inception of credit default swaps (CDS) markets on their debt, which allow hedging and speculative trading on credit risk to be carried out by creditors and other parties. We find that reference firms hold more cash after CDS trading...

We examine how executive equity risk-taking incentives affect firms' choice of debt structure. Using a longitudinal sample of U.S. firms, we document that when executive compensation is more sensitive to stock volatility (i.e., has higher vega), firms reduce their reliance on bank debt...

We find that mutual funds whose managers are socially connected with firm auditors hold more shares of these firms and generate superior portfolio returns. Cross-sectional results reveal that the relation between social connections and mutual fund stockholdings is more pronounced: when the...

We examine the impact of social ties between mutual fund managers and auditors of public firms on mutual fund stockholdings. We find that mutual funds whose managers are socially connected with firm auditors hold more shares of these firms. In cross-sectional results consistent with...

Using a sample of 4,892 IPOs in the United States from 1990 to 2019, we establish that the level of social capital in the county of the IPO firm’s headquarters is negatively associated with the level of IPO underpricing. The relation holds for a range of robustness tests, including those...