Market power in electricity wholesale markets arises when generators have incentives to mark up their offers above the cost of production.I model a transmission network with a single line. I derive optimality conditions for supply functions for generators who supply energy at both ends of the...

The unbundling of formerly vertically integrated utilities in liberalized electricity markets led to a coordination problem between investments in the regulated electricity grid and investments into new power generation. At the same time investments into new generation capacities based on...

Liberalized electricity markets are characterized by fluctuating priceinelastic demand of non-storable electricity, often defined by a substantial market share held by one or few incumbent firms. These characteristics have led to a controversial discussion concerning the need for and the design...

A shift from zonal pricing to smaller zones and nodal pricing improves efficiency and security of system operation. Resulting price changes do however also shift profits and surplus between and across generation and load. As individual actorscan lose, they might oppose any reform. We explore how...

Based upon probabilistic reliability metrics, we develop an optimization model to determine the efficient amount and location of firm generation capacity to achieve reliability targets in multiregional electricity systems. A particular focus lies on the representation and contribution of...

We estimate the welfare implications of a cost-reflective 'Coasian' reform of electricity network tariffs using an Irish case study. We find that current Distribution Use of System (DUoS) tariffs deviate considerably from a cost-reflective structure. At the individual level, tariff reform leads...

To date, the distributive implications of incentive regulation on electricity transmission networks have not been explicitly studied in the literature. More specifically, the parameters that a regulator might use to achieve distributive efficiency under price-cap regulation have not yet been...

To date, the distributive implications of incentive regulation on electricity transmission networks have not been explicitly studied in the literature. More specifically, the parameters that a regulator might use to achieve distributive efficiency under price-cap regulation have not yet been...

For quite a long time, network industries used to be regarded as (natural) monopolies. This was due to these industries having some special characteristics. Network externalities and economies of scale in particular justified the (natural) monopoly thesis. Recently, however, a trend towards...

This article explores key market design issues to be addressed in future electricity markets dominated by intermittent renewable generation with near zero private marginal costs for generating electricity. Changing technology mixes will change market outcomes, but they do not change the...